Big Cola v. Coca-Cola: How a Convenient Store Owner\u27s Complaint Resulted in One of Mexico\u27s Largest Antitrust Fines by Olsen, Travis Bennion
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
10-1-2010
Big Cola v. Coca-Cola: How a Convenient Store
Owner's Complaint Resulted in One of Mexico's
Largest Antitrust Fines
Travis Bennion Olsen
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Travis Bennion Olsen, Big Cola v. Coca-Cola: How a Convenient Store Owner's Complaint Resulted in One of Mexico's Largest Antitrust
Fines, 42 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 87 (2010)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol42/iss1/4
87
Big Cola v. Coca-Cola: How A Convenient
Store Owner's Complaint Resulted in One
of Mexico's Largest Antitrust Fines
Travis Bennion Olsen
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 87
II. THE LAW ............................................ 90
III. THE COMMISSION .................................... 90
IV. BIG COLA V. COCA-COLA ............................. 92
A . Background ...................................... 92
B. The Investigation ................................ 93
C. The Law ......................................... 95
D. The Commission's Analysis ...................... 97
1. Product Market Definition ................... 97
2. Geographic Market Definition ............... 98
3. M arket Power ............................... 99
4. Barrier to Entry ............................. 101
5. Other Considerations ........................ 103
6. The Commission's Conclusion ................ 103
7. Defense Arguments .......................... 104
8. Punishm ent .................................. 106
V . ANALYSIS ............................................ 107
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................... 113
I. INTRODUCTION
"Since the 1857 Constitution [of Mexico], an individual right
against monopolies, estancos and monopolistic practices has been
established, consecrating a right of all Mexicans to participate
freely in the market."'
Long before the Sherman or Clayton Acts were passed in the
United States, the Mexican government sought to promote eco-
nomic freedom through the prohibition of anticompetitive acts and
concentrated markets. 2 This was done in large part as a result of
years of limited economic access for the indigenous Mexican peo-
1. Fernando SAnchez Ugarte, Diez Afios de Politica de Competencia [Ten Years of
Competition Policy], La Primera D~cada de la CFC, 27, 36 (2003). See also
Constituci6n Politica de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos [Const. 1857], art. 28, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1857 (Mex.).
2. Constituci6n Politica de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos [Const. 1857], art. 28,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1857 (Mex.).
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ple.3 This anti-monopolistic ideology continued after the Revolu-
tion in 1910 and was preserved in the new Constitution of 1917.'
The country's first antitrust statute, the Monopoly Law, was
passed in 1934.' Unfortunately this law was never enforced and
the constitutional rights were not protected.6
After a time of economic instability, the government dramati-
cally shifted its stance, resulting in a thorough economic restruc-
turing.7 This was executed by privatizing government-owned
enterprises, creating and encouraging a climate of foreign direct
investment, and positioning itself on the world trading scene.s
This policy change culminated in Mexico's accession to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the sign-
ing of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).9
Through NAFTA, Mexico consented to "adopt or maintain
measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct, and...
take appropriate action with respect thereof."1 The Monopoly Law
of 1934 was "outdated and unenforced" and would not bring Mex-
ico into compliance with its NAFTA obligations." Therefore, the
Mexican Congress passed the Federal Law of Economic Competi-
tion, Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica ("LFCE" for the
Spanish acronym), in 1992.12 The new law, which was patterned
after that of the United States, 3 was seen as a "means of concep-
tualizing the antitrust policy as an instrument to promote compe-
tition through a series of legal provisions which allow challenging
monopolistic practices, prevent and penalize concentrations in
3. Ugarte, supra note 1.
4. Constituci6n Politica de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art.
28, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917.
5. Ley Organica del Articulo 28 Constitucional en Material de Monopolios,
[Monopoly Law], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 31 de Augusto de 1934 (Mex.).
See also Sergio Garcfa-Rodrfguez, Mexico's Institutional Framework for Antitrust
Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149, 1158 (1995).
6. Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1158.
7. Id. at 1154.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289, 365 (1993).
11. Joshua A. Newburg, Mexico's New Economic Competition Law: Toward the
Development of a Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587, 588
(1994).
12. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Antitrust Law], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre de 1992 (Mex.).
13. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004)); see also Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat.
730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936)).
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restraint of trade, and enhancing a general legal framework which
eliminates restrictions to the efficient operation of markets,
among other actions."14
In addition to revising the competition law, an enforcement
mechanism to prosecute anticompetitive practices, the Federal
Competition Commission, Comisi6n Federal de Competencia
("CFC" for the Spanish acronym), was established.15 The CFC is
governed by five Commissioners, one of which is designated as the
Commission's President. 6 Its mission entails "prevent[ing], inves-
tigat[ing] and combat[ing] monopolies, monopolistic practices and
mergers .17
Even though the LFCE is a similar statute to the Sherman
and Clayton Acts in the United States, the CFC's interpretation
results in a different outcome than would result in the United
States for a similar anticompetitive act. This article details one
particular CFC case, Big Cola v. Coca-Cola," which demonstrates
the Commission's analysis in terms of exclusive dealing contracts,
refusal to deal arrangements, and vertical price restrains. This
case was initiated by a convenient store owner who filed a com-
plaint with the CFC and subsequently resulted in one of the larg-
est antitrust fines in Mexico's history. 9 However, liability would
likely have not been found had the acts occurred in the United
States.
This article will explain Mexico's competition law and enforce-
ment mechanism and will narrate the Big Cola v. Coca-Cola deci-
sion with particular attention to the Commission's analysis of
product market definition, geographic market definition, market
power, and the determination of punishment. The article will then
compare the Commission's findings to the liability analysis
employed in the United States.
14. Rafael Valdes-Abascal, Concentrations an Analysis of the Mexican Economic
Competition Legal Framework Relevant Cases, 9 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 57 (2001).
15. Garcia-Rodrfguez, supra note 5, at 1163.
16. LFCE, art. 25 (Mex.).
17. Id. at art. 24.
18. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, Pdgina 1
(Mex.).
19. James Hider, Woman Who Flattened Coca-Cola, TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, http:/!
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and-americas/article591379.ece. See Sinca
Imbursa, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, 10-002-2006, The Coca-Cola Company y Otros, DE-
006-2000 (Mex.).
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II. THE LAW
The LFCE divides anti-competitive practices into two catego-
ries, absolute and relative monopolistic practices. Absolute, simi-
lar to "per se" in the U.S., bars price-fixing, bid-rigging, the
dividing of markets, and establishing an obligation limiting the
amount of goods sold.2° Relative monopolistic practices include
tying and refusal to deal agreements, exclusive dealing contracts,
vertical price and non-price maintenance, boycotts, and as a catch-
all, any act that would impede competition.2'
III. THE COMMISSION
The CFC is an administrative agency empowered to investi-
20. LFCE, art. 9 (Mex.). ("Absolute monopolistic practices are contracts,
agreements, arrangements, or combinations among competitive economic agents,
whose aim or effect are any of the following: I. [t]o fix, raise, to agree upon or
manipulate the purchase or sale price of the goods or services supplied or demanded
in the markets, or to exchange information with the same aim or effect; II. [t]o
establish the obligation to produce, process, distribute or market only a restricted or
limited amount of goods, or to render a specific volume, number, or frequency of
restricted or limited services; III. [t]o divide, distribute, assign or impose portions or
segments of the current or potential market of goods and services, by means of a
determinable group of customers, suppliers, time or spaces; or IV. [t]o establish, agree
upon or coordinate bids or to abstain from bids, tenders, public auctions or bidding.").
Note that the LFCE has been amended since the Big Cola case was decided. All
citations in this article refer to the previous version which was used in the analysis of
that decision.
21. Id. at art. 10. ("Relative monopolistic practices are deemed to be those acts,
contracts, agreements or combinations, which aim or effect is to improperly displace
other agents from the market, substantially hinder their access thereto, or to
establish exclusive advantages in favor of one or several entities or individuals, in the
following cases: I. [some of the economic agents that do not compete among
themselves are: to set, impose or establish the exclusive distribution of goods and
services, by means of the subject, geographical location, or specific periods of time,
including the division, distribution or assignment of customers and suppliers; and
also the obligation to not manufacture or distribute goods or services for a specific
period of time or that may be specified; II. [tlo set the prices or other conditions that a
distributor or supplier has to abide by when marketing or distributing goods or
providing services; III. [tihe conditioned sale or transaction when buying, acquiring,
marketing or providing other goods or additional services, normally different or that
can be differentiated, or on the basis of reciprocity; IV. [tihe sale or transaction
subject to the condition of not using or acquiring, marketing or providing goods or
services produced, processed or distributed or sold by a third party; V. [tihe unilateral
action based on refusing to sell or provide to specific individuals, goods or services
available and normally offered to third parties; VI. [tihe agreement reached among
several economic agents or the invitation extended them to exert pressure against
customers or suppliers, in order to discourage them from specific behaviors, to apply
retaliations or force them to act in a specific manner; or VII. [iun general, all the
actions that unduly damage or impair the process of competition and free access to
production, processing, distribution and marketing of goods and services.")
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gate, determine guilt, and impose penalties for all anticompetitive
practices.22 CFC investigations can be initiated by a private party
who files a complaint with the agency or can originate with the
Commission itself.23 For absolute or per se violations, any person
or entity may file a complaint with the CFC, but if the act is only a
relative monopolistic practice, then the complainant must have
suffered actual or potential damage.24
A private party must file its complaint with the Commission
and the CFC; there is not a right to a private civil suit. The Com-
mission has the power to determine guilt and impose punishment;
the courts are excluded from competition-related rulings in
regards to a constitutional challenge.25 In fact, if a party feels that
the CFC erred in its analysis or interpretation of the law, the
party may only file an appeal with the Commission itself to
"revoke, amend, modify, or confirm" its own ruling.26 As a result,
the CFC enjoys broader enforcement power than any other admin-
istrative entity in Mexico.27
In its brief history, the CFC has utilized its distinctive
authority to end anticompetitive practices, break-up cartels, pre-
clude concentrated mergers, and impose fines on the offenders.
From its inception in 1993 through 2007, the Commission has
ruled on 870 decisions on anticompetitive practices and 3,149 deci-
sions on mergers.28 In 2009 alone, the CFC imposed a total of
409,663,327 Mexican pesos, approximately USD 31,850,175.29
22. Id. at art. 24. ("The Commission shall have the following powers: 1.) to
investigate competition law offenses, at the request of a private party or on its own
initiative; 2.) to resolve administrative cases in the area of competition law, impose
administrative penalties and refer criminal business to the Attorney General; 3.) to
issue advisory opinions upon request by the Executive Branch regarding Competition
Law implication of draft laws and regulation; 4.) to issue legal opinions, on its own
initiative, regarding competition and free market access issues; and 5.) to participate
in the negotiation and execution of international competition policy, treaties and
agreements.").
23. Id. at art. 30.
24. Id. at art. 32.
25. Garcfa-Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1175-76.
26. LFCE, art. 39 (Mex.). Despite the appearance of a possible conflict of interest,
the Commission has overturned its own decisions. See RA-26-2006 (decision
overturned based on an incorrect relevant market definition of alcoholic beverages);
RA-36-2001 (decision overturned based on an incorrect relevant market definition of
telephone services).
27. Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1164.
28. Informe Annual, Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] 88 (2009) (Mex.).
29. Id. at 91. U.S. Dollar amount based on currency rate of 12.8622 in December
2009. See Foreign Exchange Rates, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5/20100104/.
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IV. BIG CoLA v. CocA-CoLA
A. Background
In 2001, Mexico had a per capita soda consumption rate of
149.9 liters annually, the second highest in the world behind the
United States." "Practically every family consumes [soda] which
is perhaps why it's considered basic [to daily life]." 3 This industry
also represented 10.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product divi-
sion of food, drink, and tobacco, and 0.6 percent of the national
GDP.32
Specifically, to illustrate the prominence of Coca-Cola in Mex-
ico - in the community of Mitzit6n, in the state of Chiapas, the
local council and only store were run by the same man, Jos6 San-
tiz. "The Coca-Cola Company gave him a refrigerator, chairs,
tables, and other gifts in exchange for selling a minimum amount
of soda each month. Santfz, in turn, forced other members of the
council to raise the money to buy eight or nine cases of Coke from
him each month; otherwise, he said, he would close the much-
needed store."33
The strength and influence of this industry was noticed by a
Peruvian company, Ajemex, which introduced its soda, Big Cola,
to Mexico in 2002. Within two years of its entry, Big Cola had
gained five percent of the market and had a presence in twenty-six
of the thirty-two states of Mexico with thirty-one distribution cen-
ters.3 4 Coca-Cola was aware of this change in consumer preference
as evidenced by its subsequent actions. In 2003, a convenient store
owner, Raquel Chavez, of the Iztapalapa area of Mexico City, was
approached by her Coca-Cola distributors and asked not to sell
Big Cola anymore.3 She refused. Chavez stated, "I always told
them 'no'. I knew that Mexico was a free country and I was free
and that in my shop I'm the boss."36
Unfortunately, the deliveries to her store of Coca-Cola
stopped and her revenue declined. "If a store doesn't sell Coca-
30. Karla Torrijos, La Chispa de la Competencia, LA JORNADA, May 31, 2004,
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/200405/31/008nlsec.html.
31. Angeles Cruz Martinez, Los Mexicanos Consumen 146 Litros de Refresco al
Afio, en Promedio, LA JORNADA, Dec. 17, 2006, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/12/
17/index.php?section=sociedad&article=O37nlsoc.
32. Torrijos, supra note 30.
33. Beverly Bell, Cola Wars in Mexico, IN THESE TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2840.
34. Id.
35. Hider, supra note 19.
36. Id.
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Cola, it's condemned to failure, to ruin. That's why Coca-Cola has
been able to dominate everyone. 37 When she complained she was
told, "We can do whatever we want. Coca-[C]ola has so many law-
yers and so much money that no one can do anything to it."3" Not
wanting to give in to Coca-Cola's demands, Chavez began buying
Coca-[C]ola from other retailers and used her own car to deliver
the goods to her store.3 9 This was not a very viable or profitable
option, so on May 12, 2003, she filed a complaint with the CFC
alleging anticompetitive practices by Coca-Cola in refusing to sell
their product to her unless she stopped selling a rival's product. °
The Commission launched an investigation on June 5, 2003, and
in August, Ajemex filed to join the complaint." The Commission
investigated several potential defendants and heard pretrial
motions. 2 On March 28, 2005, the CFC issued its tentative find-
ings of liability and requested that twenty-one entities within the
Coca-Cola system submit their arguments in defense of the pro-
posed violations.4 On June 30, 2005, the CFC rendered its final
decision regarding the allegations."
B. The Investigation
Ajemex complained that the entire Coca-Cola system violated
the law by placing restrictions on retail stores prohibiting the sale
of Big Cola, by refusing to sell Coca-Cola products to those that
did not comply and by awarding promotions for those who did
comply.4 5 Ajemex submitted to the Commission the results of
interviews it conducted with 184 retail stores in ten metropolitan
areas where it operates. 46 The results showed 178 were under a
condition to not sell Big Cola, 168 would have promotions taken
away if they sold Big Cola, 116 would have a refrigerator taken
away if they sold Big Cola, 62 sold Big Cola but did not display it,




40. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, Pigina 1
(Mex.).
41. Id. at 1-2.
42. Id. at 3-28.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id. at 28.
45. Id. at 55-56.
46. Id. at 58 (stating that the metropolitan areas consist of Mexico City, Acapulco,
Guadalajara, Merida, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quentaro, Veracruz, Jalapa, and Leon).
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contracts with Coca-Cola, and 12 had Big Cola advertisements
destroyed.47
At one store in Mexico City, which sells almost every brand of
soda, Coca-Cola not only threatened to take away promotions, but
went one step further by exchanging one package of Big Cola from
the store with two packages of Coca-Cola from the distributor.
Distributors even removed twist-off bottle caps of Big Cola and
poured the soda down the drain so that their rival's product could
not be sold.49 Another store in Queretaro signed an exclusive deal-
ing contract with Coca-Cola through which the store would receive
a twenty percent discount and have its building painted for free if
it would only sell Coca-Cola products.50
Each of the acts complained of were committed by various
entities, but each under the name of Coca-Cola. Therefore, before
analyzing the legality of those actions, the Commission defined
the Coca-Cola network system in Mexico and the responsibility
each held. The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) is headquartered in
Atlanta and uses the Coca-Cola Export Company (TCCEC) to
market its product outside of the United States. 1 TCCEC "devel-
ops and carries out the commercial procedures for the sale of
[Coca-Cola Products]" and "collaborates with different bottlers of
TCCC brand products in making the plans of and supporting mar-
keting and publicity.., and carrying out the bottling, distribution
and sale of the final product."5 2 These exclusive bottlers receive a
license from TCCEC to work within a previously determined geo-
graphic area and are given the responsibility to promote sales
with individual retailers. 3 The bottlers and their subsidiaries
maintain contacts with the clients, establish prices, and ensure
that contracts with retailers are maintained.54 They work under
contracts with TCCC through the authorization of TCCEC, who
directs marketing and publicity.5
The Commission determined that the bottlers are legally
responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries because of their
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id. at 103.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 104.
51. Id. at 30. See also Anniversary of an Icon, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, http:ll
www.thecoca-colacompany.com/presscenter/presskitcontour-bottle-timeline.html.
52. See Propimex, DE-21-2003.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 51.
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parent-child relationship. 6 The Commission also found TCCEC to
be legally responsible for the actions of the bottlers, and thereby
the subsidiaries, because of its involvement in marketing, public-
ity, and familiarity with the workings of the bottlers. 7 In all,
twenty-two entities within the Coca-Cola system, including
TCCEC, could be found liable if the actions complained of were
determined to be violations of the LFCE.
58
C. The Law
Article 10 of the LFCE considers "the sale, purchase or trans-
action subject to a condition to not use, acquire, sell, market, or
provide goods or services . . . to a third party" and "unilateral
action consisting in refusing to sell, market, or provide to specified
persons goods or service available and normally offered to third
parties" as relative monopolistic practices. 9 The CFC determined
that parts of the Coca-Cola system had engaged in "1.) the sale or
transaction under the condition to not use or acquire, sell or pro-
portion the goods or services produced, processed, distributed or
market to a third party, in this case the brands of soda Big Cola,
Mega Big, Doble Big and First, all of whom are produced and dis-
tributed by Ajemex, and 2.) the unilateral action consisting in
refusing to sell or proportion to specific people goods or services
available and normally offered to third parties with the purpose of
restricting the supply of Ajemex products and the establishing of
the products of brands Big Cola, Mega Big, Doble Big and First" in
violation of Article 10 of the LFCE.60 These actions can be charac-
terized as exclusive dealing contracts and refusal to deal
arrangements.
To determine whether these specific anticompetitive acts
result in liability requires "a case-by-case analysis rather than a
56. Id. at 31-51.
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. Id. (listing the entities as TCCEC, Coca Cola Femsa, Propimex, Refrescos y
Aguas Minerales, Inmuebles del Golfo, Panamco Bajio, Panamco Golfo, Grupo
Continental, Embotelladora La Favorita, Embotelladora Zapopan, Yoli de Acapulco,
Agua de Taxco Yoli, Fomento Queretano, Embotelladora La Victoria, Refrescos
Victoria del Centro, Embotelladora de San Juan, Administraci6n Peninsular
Corporativa, Industria Refr6squela Peninsular, Industria Embotelladora de
Campeche, Embotelladora del Caribe, and Embotelladora Peninsular).
59. See generally Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Antitrust Law],
as amended, Diario Oficial de la FederaciS6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre de 1992 (Mex.).
60. Propimex, DE-021-2003 at 104.
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draconian or inflexible presumption."6 The statutory requirement
for a finding of liability is that the offending party holds "substan-
tial power in the relevant market and that they are carried out
regarding the goods or services corresponding to that relevant
market. '62 To determine the relevant market "the Commission
shall identify the goods or services which make up the relevant
market... those that may be substituted for them... [and] shall
define the geographic area in which the said goods or services are
supplied or in demand, and within which the option exists to go
without distinction to suppliers and customers without incurring
appreciably different costs." 3 The CFC will specifically consider
the substitutability of goods considering technological issues, dis-
tribution costs of the goods and its possible substitutes, the cost
and access to other markets, and any government standards that
may restrict access to alternatives.'
Overall substantial power is determined by the standing of
the goods in the relevant market, the lack of imports, and the high
cost for consumers if suppliers were switched. 5 Specifically, the
Commission examines market share, barriers to entry, existence
and power of competitors, competitors' access to input sources, the
firm's recent behavior, and any other criteria established by law.6
Market share is determined by "sales indicators, the number of
customers, productive capacity and any other factor the Commis-
61. Gabriel Castaneda Gallardo, Antitrust Enforcement in Mexico 1993-1995 and
Its Prospects, 4. U.S.-MEx. L.J. 19, 23 (1996).
62. LFCE, art. 11 (Mex.).
63. Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [RLFCE] [Federal
Regulation of Economic Competition], art. 9, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 4 de
Marzo de 1998 (Mex.). ("For the effects of Article 12 of the Law, the Commission shall
identify the goods or services which make up the relevant market, whether produced,
marketed or supplied by the economic agents, and those that are or may be
substituted for them, whether domestic or foreign, as well as the time required for
such substitution to take place. Subsequently the Commission shall define the
geographic area in which the said goods or services are supplied or in demand, and
within which the option exists to go without distinction to suppliers and customers
without incurring appreciably different costs; the Commission shall also take into
consideration the cost of distributing the said good or service, and the cost and the
probabilities of access to alternative markets. Likewise, those economic and
normative restrictions of a local, federal or international nature which prevent access
to the said substitute goods or services, or which prevent the access of users or
consumers to alternative sources of supply, or the access of the suppliers to
alternative customers, shall be considered."). Note that the RLFCE has been amended
since the Big Cola case was decided. All citations in this article refer to the previous
version which was used in the analysis of that decision.
64. LFCE, art. 12 (Mex.).
65. RLFCE, art. 13 (Mex.).
66. LFCE, art. 13 (Mex.).
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sion deems appropriate."67 Barriers to entry into the market con-
tribute to a firm's market power in that market. The Regulations
define barriers to entry as financial costs to developing alternative
channels of distribution, the amount and period of recoupment for
investment, government authorization, investment for advertis-
ing, limitation on competition from international markets, restric-
tions based on common practice in the market, and government
discrimination of incentives or assistance.8
D. The Commission's Analysis
1. Product Market Definition
To define the relevant product market, the CFC analyzed pos-
sible substitutes of carbonated sodas to determine whether "those
products would satisfy the identical needs of the consumer and
whether he or she could opt for those products with similar condi-
tions of price, quality and opportunity.
69
Carbonated drinks are sold in two types of containers: open
and closed. Open containers" are sold to restaurants or other sim-
ilar establishments for consumption at the place of purchase while
closed containers are sold to retail stores and consumed in other
locations.7 As evidenced by the distribution of two Coca-Cola bot-
tlers, Panamco and Grupo Contal, the difference in sales for each
is dramatic: 77 percent and 79.2 percent of sales were of closed
containers, respectively, and 72 percent and 69.7 percent were
sold to retail stores, respectively.72 Because the contrast in sales is
so wide and consumers are generally not able to purchase closed
containers at the same location as open containers, the CFC con-
cluded that there are two very separate channels of distribution,
open containers sold to restaurants and closed containers sold to
retail stores.73 Therefore the market for the case in question solely
comprises closed containers sold to retail stores. 4
There are three types of carbonated drinks: colas, flavored
67. RLFCE, art. 11 (Mex.).
68. Id. at art. 12.
69. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, P~gina
114 (Mex.).
70. In the United States, open containers of soda would be considered "fountain
71. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 109-11.
72. Id. at 109.
73. Id. at 110.
74. Id.
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sodas, and mineral water. Other than flavor, the only difference
between the carbonated drinks is the level of caffeine. 5 According
to the CFC, any carbonated drink will satisfy the same needs of
the consumer because of the lack of variation. And since the tech-
nology of the manufacturing process of carbonated beverages is
identical regardless of flavor or bottle size, colas, flavored sodas,
and mineral water can be substituted one for another.77 Therefore,
the relevant market includes any carbonated drink."
The CFC also considered other beverages like bottled water,
fruit juice, alcoholic drinks, hydrating drinks, milk, coffee, and tea
as possible substitutes for carbonated beverages but determined
that none met the consumers' identical needs.79 Bottled water is
consumed principally for health reasons due to the distrust of the
tap water system. 0 The price of water and fruit juice varies so
greatly from that of carbonated drinks that a rise in the price of
these beverages would not cause consumers to switch." Alcoholic
beverages are not adequate substitutes because of the restrictions
placed on their sale and consumption, such as to whom they can
be sold and where they can be consumed. 2 Hydrating beverages
are consumed after exercise, or other physical activity, and are not
recommended at other times. 3 Milk, coffee, and tea generally
require some form of preparation and are served hot.'
The CFC concluded that the only appropriate substitutes that
could meet the identical needs of consumers are other carbonated
beverages sold in closed containers with the purpose of consump-
tion in a place different from the point of purchase. Hence, the
relevant product market in this case is carbonated beverages sold
in closed bottles to retail stores.
2. Geographic Market Definition
The Commission next defined the relevant geographic market
of manufacturing, distribution, and marketing possible substi-
tutes from other areas. The Coca-Cola Export Company estab-
75. Id. at 106.
76. Id. at 107.
77. Id. at 109.
78. Id. at 106-09.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 112-13.
82. Id. at 113.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 111-14.
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lished a franchise system in Mexico which authorizes bottlers to
manufacturer, bottle, distribute, and sell the product to a previ-
ously designated area of Mexico. 6 Coca-Cola maintains seventy-
nine bottling plants and 465 distributing centers throughout the
country.87 Coca-Cola has 1,100,000 points of sale throughout Mex-
ico."8 TCCEC manages the contracts with each bottler, supervises
their operations, and directs the nation-wide publicity of the prod-
ucts. 9 The CFC determined that because of the magnitude of the
interconnected Coca-Cola system, the relevant geographic area is
the entire nation of Mexico with respect to the manufacturing,
bottling, and transporting of the carbonated drinks in closed bot-
tles and the coordination of TCCEC policies. 90
The marketing policies and promotions, such as free refriger-
ators to retailers, are devised and administered by the bottlers.9
These local marketing policies are the anticompetitive acts which
the CFC has denounced. The acts occurred in the ten metropolitan
areas where Ajemex is currently established which, according to
the CFC, denote those ten cities as the relevant geographic area
with respect to the distribution and marketing of carbonated
drinks in closed bottles.92
3. Market Power
Next, the Commission determined whether Coca-Cola sus-
tained sufficient power in the relevant market to warrant a find-
ing of liability for its anticompetitive practices. The regulatory
factors which indicate market power are "sales indicators, number
of customers, productive capacity, or any other factor that the
Commission deems appropriate."93 Taking those factors into con-
sideration, the principal question to answer is whether the firm in
question "can unilaterally fix prices or restrict supply in the rele-
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id. at 116. Big Cola is relatively new to the country; it began selling its
products in Mexico in March of 2002 and only has one bottling plant in the state of
Puebla and twenty-five distributing centers.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id. at 127. The Commission considered probable substitutes from other
markets but found substitutes unlikely due to the high cost of switching markets and
the low level importation despite soda's duty free status, as well as a single consumer
protection law that restricts alternatives. Id. at 125-27.
91. Id. at 123.
92. Id. at 124.
93. Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [RLFCE] [Federal
Regulation of Economic Competition], art. 11, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 4
de Marzo de 1998 (Mex.).
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vant market without competitors being able to counteract such
power either actually or potentially."
9 4
As a benchmark, the Commission used the standard in the
industry for determining sales in the market: the percentage of
sales for twenty-four eight ounce bottles of carbonated bever-
ages.9 5 Using this standard, Coca-Cola was responsible for 68.1
percent of sales throughout Mexico in 2001 and 70.6 percent in
2002;96 however, that takes into account both open and closed con-
tainers and the relevant market for this case is only closed bot-
tles. 7 But one bottler, Grupo Contal, estimated that 69.7 percent
of its sales are closed bottles to retailers.9" For this reason, the
CFC deemed 69.7 percent a "consistent approximation" of the
market power for the nationwide geographic market of the manu-
facturing, bottling, and transporting of the carbonated drinks in
closed bottles and the coordination of TCCEC policies.99
Since the CFC concluded that the relevant geographic market
for the local marketing policies and promotions is the specific met-
ropolitan areas where the denounced conduct occurred, the Com-
mission calculated market power in each city by the percentage of
each city based on the national per capita consumption."' Based
on its calculations, the Commission determined that Coca-Cola's
market power ranged from 65.9 percent to 85.99 percent in the ten
individual metropolitan areas in 2002.U1 This same method also
found that the Coca-Cola system had an estimated national power
of 69.5 percent of per capita consumption in 2002, which is nearly
identical to the 70.6 percent based solely on volume of sales that
year. 102
The Commission concluded that Coca-Cola had the capacity
to set prices without a significant change in demand.0 3 Its reason-
ing was based on three criteria: 1.) consumers prefer Coca-Cola
94. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 127.
95. Id. at 127.




100. Id. at 130 n.4. The national per capita consumption is obtained by 1.) the
estimated sale of sodas in the country in 2002 divided by 2,064,000,000 (the total
amount of soda sold that year) and 2.) divided by the population in 2002 with a basis
in the population in 2000 and applying annual growth rate of the same between 1995
and 2000. The state of Oaxaca was calculated based on the production of the plant in
that area because the region is mountainous and sparsely populated.
101. Id. at 131.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 134.
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brand soda over others;104 2.) the differentiation of products allows
different pricing policies for different consumers; 1 5 and 3.) the fact
that Coca-Cola products are more expensive than its competitors
but continue to out sell those rivals."6 Specifically, the introduc-
tion of different bottle types, sizes, and flavors, such as Lift and
Coca Cola Lite, have increased sales and satisfied consumer
needs, which have been accomplished even though competitors,
like Pepsi, have lowered their prices on similar products.0 7 The
CFC rationalized that "Ajemex principally offered [similar] prod-
ucts... with a lower price, but this company has a reduced capac-
ity to bottle and distribute its product and as such it would have
no capacity to restrict the ability of the Coca-Cola system and its
bottlers to set prices."0 8
4. Barrier to Entry
Any analysis of market power requires considering any barri-
ers to entry into the relevant market. The Regulations define bar-
riers to entry as 1.) financial costs to develop alternative channels;
2.) limited access to financing, technology, or efficient distribution
channels; 3.) the amount of recoupment of the required invest-
ment; 4.) the need for governmental license or permits; 5.) the
investment in advertising and lack of competition from interna-
tional markets; 6.) restrictions based on common trade practices
in the relevant market; and 7.) discriminatory practices of govern-
mental officials in awarding government subsidies.0 9 The first ele-
104. Id. at 131-32.
105. Id. at 132.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 134.
109. Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [RLFCE] [Federal
Regulation of Economic Competition], art. 11, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 4
de Marzo de 1998 (Mex.). ("For the effects of Article 13, section II, of the Law,
elements which may be regarded as entry barriers include the following: I. [flinancial
costs or the costs of developing alternative channels, limited access to financing,
technology or efficient channels of distribution; II. [tihe amount, indivisibility and
period of recoupment of the required investment, as well as the absence or scarce
profitability of alternative uses of infrastructure and equipment; III. [tihe need to
possess concessions, licenses, permits or any kind of governmental authorization, as
well as rights of use or usufruct protected by legislation in the area of intellectual and
industrial property; IV. [tihe investment in advertising required for a trademark or
trading name to acquire a presence in the market sufficient to enable it to compete
with already established trademarks or names; V. [tihe limitations on competition in
international markets; VI. [tihe restrictions constituted by the common practice of the
economic agents already established in the relevant market; and VII. [tihe acts of
federal, state, or municipal authorities which discriminate in the awarding of
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ment to analyze is "the financial costs to develop alternative
channels, the limited access to financing, technology, or efficient
distribution channels.""' Coca-Cola's distribution network is over-
whelmingly large with 22,000 fleet vehicles, 11,000 routes and
3.18 visits per week to each point of sale."' The additional market-
ing and promotions, such as free refrigerators, contribute to the
financial costs of participating in the soda market.11 2 Initial
investment in the industry is great, requiring approximately
twelve months of work simply to construct a bottling plant."
3
Competition in financing is particularly difficult because the
Coca-Cola Company can provide lines of credit of $250,000,000 to
its subsidiaries.'14 Because of the high cost of entry and distribu-
tion, the Commission reasoned that barriers to entry exist in dis-
tributing and marketing of the carbonated beverages in the ten
relevant areas, as well as nationally. 115
The need for government licenses, the actions of government
officials, or competition from international markets did not pose
any problems to enter the market but an investment in publicity
did." Publicity included national television and radio advertising
and supplying bottlers with money and merchandise to promote
their own marketing policies.'17 In 2002 alone, TCCC paid
6,672,000 Mexican pesos (USD 683,116.62)1 to the bottler Coca-
Cola Femsa for marketing.1 9 The CFC reasoned that such a large
amount paid by the parent company impedes a competitor's abil-
ity to adequately invest and enter the market.1 20 Barriers to entry
were also found in the common practices of the market. In 2001,
Coca-Cola Femsa reported receiving 385,730,000 Mexican pesos
(USD 39,224,120.40)121 from TCCC just to purchase refrigerators,
promotional incentives, subsidies or assistance to certain producers or distributors, or
firms marketing or supplying goods or services.").
110. Id.
111. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 120-22, 134.
112. Id. at 136.
113. Id. at 139. However, recoupment of one's investment does not present a barrier
to entry. Id. at 142.
114. Id. at 137.
115. Id. at 140.
116. Id. at 142, 144-46.
117. Id. at 143.
118. Foreign Exchange Rates, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (July 1,
2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5/20020701/.
119. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 143.
120. Id. at 143-44.
121. Foreign Exchange Rates, supra note 118.
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which was a common practice in the soda industry. 122 The public-
ity and marketing expenses which are paid by the parent company
and the common practices between parent and child companies
create significant barriers to entry in the ten metropolitan areas
where the anticompetitive conduct occurred.
123
5. Other Considerations
The next element to determine substantial market power is
the existence and power of Coca-Cola's competitors. In 2002, the
carbonated drink market was divided nationally among Coca-Cola
at 70.6 percent, Pepsi at 19.3 percent, and all others at 10.1 per-
cent.124 Specifically, in the ten designated geographic markets, the
combined power of Coca-Cola's competitors ranged from 14.7 per-
cent to 34.1 percent. 125 The CFC concluded that this small market
control by its competitors, combined with the general consumer
preference toward Coca-Cola and the size of Coca-Cola's distribu-
tion system, proved low market capacity among Coca-Cola's
competitors. 26
The Commission also considered Coca-Cola's competitors'
access to input sources. Manufacturing and bottling carbonated
soda require several elements, such as concentrates, sugar, alumi-
num to make cans, plastic to make bottles, and other necessary
material. Larger companies have greater access to these materials
than smaller, less-established companies through vertical integra-
tion. 127 For example, the Coca-Cola Company provides soda con-
centrates directly to its subsidiaries, the bottlers.28 Another issue
is joint ventures with manufacturers or producers of required
material. One bottler, Coca-Cola Femsa, possesses 19.6 percent of
the capital of an aluminum can producer. 29 Without these sources
of materials, smaller companies are at a distinct disadvantage to
their larger competitors. 3 °
6. The Commission's Conclusion
The Commission determined that Coca-Cola's ability to set
122. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 145.
123. Id. at 144-46.
124. Id. at 146.
125. Id. at 147.
126. Id. at 148.
127. Id. at 149.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Id.
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prices and the barriers to entry showed its strong presence in the
market.3 1 Specifically, the CFC found substantial market power
in the distributing and marketing of carbonated drinks in closed
bottles of twenty-one different bottlers or subsidiaries in the ten
metropolitan areas where the anticompetitive conduct occurred.
132
The CFC also ruled that TCCEC maintained substantial power
nationally in the manufacturing, bottling, transporting, and dis-
tributing market.133 Because the offending parties held substan-
tial market power in the relevant market, the CFC concluded that
each of the twenty-two enumerated entities within the Coca-Cola
system that could be found liable for the stated violations of the
LFCE were in fact liable.'
7. Defense Arguments
After the initial finding of liability, the denounced parties
filed arguments explaining why they were not liable for the
denounced conduct. 35 As a result, seven different bottlers or their
subsidiaries were declared innocent. 36 The bottlers and their sub-
sidiaries were able to show that they did not fall into the relevant
geographic market, the actions of another were mistaken for their
own, the connection to a subsidiary was too weak, or the services
they provided within the Coca-Cola system did not meet the rele-
vant market.
137
The CFC then proceeded to respond to the arguments of the
fifteen remaining entities. The main contention was the lack of
evidence that the denounced conduct was part of a system-wide
policy, but that the evidence proved the contrary. 3 The defend-
ants presented several areas throughout Mexico where Coca-Cola
and Big Cola are both sold but where there were no anticompeti-
tive practices. 39 They also contended that had there been a sys-
tem-wide policy, each bottler would have committed the same
anticompetitive acts, when in fact some signed exclusive dealing
contracts with the retailers, others refused to sell to certain retail-
ers, others gave incentives to retailers, and others destroyed Big
131. Id. at 134, 140, 146.
132. Id. at 153-54.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 154.
135. Id. at 155.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 156-58.
138. Id. at 164-65.
139. Id.
104
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Cola merchandise and advertising.14 °
The CFC responded to the defendants' arguments by conclud-
ing that the denounced acts were clearly a result of a policy by
Coca-Cola.' The established franchise system supports a finding
of a cooperative, concerted effort.12 The CFC determined that the
combined producing, bottling, distributing, and marketing create
a cycle in which each entity participates, and without such partici-
pation in the interrelated activities, the system would fail.'43
TCCEC was specifically involved through its publicity and mar-
keting in mass media, in addition to manufacturing concentrates
and developing procedures for the sale of its goods.'44
The Commission reasoned that the single entity view protects
a franchise system from certain violations of the competition law.
"If those that form a franchise were independent [then] . .. [the]
territorial divisions in which they work.., could be considered a
monopolistic practice."4 ' TCCEC has divided Mexico geographi-
cally and enters into contracts with bottlers which prohibit them
from operating in a different geographic area. 4 ' Generally, the
geographic dividing of markets is an absolute monopolistic prac-
tice, or a per se violation according to Article 9 of the LFCE.'4'
However, because it occurred within the Coca-Cola system,
amongst a single entity, it is not viewed as an unlawful division.'48
The Commission, therefore, concluded that protection against one
violation provides the basis of liability for another violation. 14 9
Accordingly, each component within the Coca-Cola entity, includ-
ing the head of the TCCEC organization, is co-responsible for the
decisions made by and within the system."'
140. Id.




145. Id. at 181.
146. Id.
147. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Antitrust Law], as amended,
art. 9 § III, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre de 1992 (Mex.).
("Absolute monopolistic practices are ... dividing, distributing, assigning or imposing
portions or segments of an actual or potential market of goods or services by
determined or determinable clientele, providers, times or areas.").
148. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 181.
149. Id.
150. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with this view in Copperweld Corp v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) ("[Tlhe coordinated activity of a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise
for purposes of section one of the Sherman Act.").
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8. Punishment
According to Article 35 of the LFCE, the CFC can impose a
fine up to 225,000 times the daily minimum wage in the Federal
District and suspend relative monopolistic practices. 151 However,
"in the event of a repeated offense, an additional fine may be
assessed up to twice the initial amount."152 The daily minimum
wage for the Federal District, Mexico City, was 48.6 Mexican
pesos (USD 4.63) 153 at the time of this case. 54 The LFCE provides
the criteria by which a fine is assessed: "the seriousness of the
violation, the damage caused, the degree of premeditation, the
participation in the markets of the infringer, the size of the mar-
ket affected, the length of the practice or concentration and the
recurrence or background of the infringer, and also its financial
status."155 The Commission evaluated each element individually
for each defendant, but because the acts were committed by vari-
ous groups and subsidiaries of a single entity, the Commission's
findings of each criterion was the same for all defendants, with
minor exceptions."'
The CFC concluded that the conduct was serious because it
impeded the process of competition and the free market. 57 The
barrier to consumer choice caused harm to an individual's right;
the CFC did not look at any economic damage to Ajemex. 15 The
Commission's conclusion on this point follows the constitutional
right to freely access the market as opposed to a legislative ability
to be compensated for economic harm.'59 The CFC found that the
consequences of restricting market access and the ability of con-
sumers and retailers to choose were foreseeable and Coca-Cola's
acts were therefore intentional.16 ° Though market participation
151. LFCE, art. 9 § V (Mex.). The statute allows aggrieved parties to receive
compensation for the damages they incurred as a result of the anticompetitive
practices. The party must file a separate claim to recoup.
152. Id.
153. Foreign Exchange Rates, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (July 1,
2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5/20020701.
154. The fine was $10,530,000, which divided by 225,000 (the percentage imposed)
equals 48.6.
155. LFCE, art. 36 (Mex.).
156. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, Pdgina
341-437 (Mex.).
157. Id. at 342.
158. Id. at 341.
159. Constituci6n Politica de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos [Const. 1857], art. 28,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1857 (Mex.).
160. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 344.
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and size differed for each defendant depending on their location,
each participated substantially to warrant a fine. 61 The duration
of the conduct was determined to be at least from the time the
complaint was filed with the CFC.162 The Commission defines
recidivism as committing the same specific violations.163 Coca-Cola
had never previously violated sections IV and V of Article 10 of the
LFCE and therefore recidivism was not an issue.' The CFC also
found that the defendants had sufficient economic power and
resources to pay the maximum fine for each defendant.6  The
Commission concluded that because there is such a high per cap-
ita'Coca-Cola consumption rate, each bottler and their subsidiar-
ies had enough resources to pay a fine.1
66
Each of the fifteen liable entities 61 was fined the maximum
amount, 225,000 times the daily minimum wage for Mexico City,
which totaled 10,530,000 Mexican pesos (USD 973,197.78)161
each."'69 The combined total of all the defendants, 157,950,000
pesos171 (USD 14,597,966), is one of the largest antitrust fines in
Mexico's history."'7 The Commission also ordered the suppression
of these practices."2
V. ANALYSIS
The Commission spends a considerable amount of time detail-
ing the incentives for compliance with the requirements Coca-Cola
imposed on the retailers. Some of these vertical non-price
restraints are similar to the actions taken by a Texas Coca-Cola
bottler in the Texas Supreme Court case, Coca-Cola Co. v. Har-
161. Id. at 345-46.
162. Id. at 346.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 347
166. Id.
167. Id. (referring to TCCEC, Coca-Cola Femsa, Propimex, Inmuebles de Golfo,
Panamco M~xico, Panamco Bajio, Panamco Golfo, Grupo Contal, Embotelladora La
Favorita, Embotelladora Zapporan, Industrial Refresco Peninsular, Embotelladora La
Victoria, Embotelladora Refresco Victoria del Centro, and Embotelladora San Juan).
168. Based on the June 2005 exchange rate. See Foreign Exchange Rates, FEDERAL
RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (July 1, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
G5/20050701/g5.htm.
169. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 340-437.
170. See Foreign Exchange Rates, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (July 1,
2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5/20050701/g5.htm.
171. Hider, supra note 19, at 3.
172. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 439.
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mar Bottling Co.'73 In that case, the bottler was sued for its prac-
tice of calendar marketing agreements requiring promotional
preferences, displaying of products in "impulse zones," enlarging
cooler space, and reducing prices. 74 Retailers received discounts,
promotions, and bonuses for their compliance and promotional
efforts. 7 ' The main issue was whether the bottler used its "domi-
nant position in [the region] to aggressively negotiate [its agree-
ments with retailers] with terms that suppressed competition
from other bottlers."1 7 6 The bottler controlled seventy-five percent
to eighty percent of the relevant market,'77 similar to the 65.9 per-
cent to 85.99 percent of the relevant metropolitan markets in Big
Cola.7 ' The defendants in Harmar were found liable and fined
USD 14,644,696.40 by the District Court.'79 That fine mirrors the
approximate USD 14,597,966 that the Coca-Cola defendants were
fined in Mexico.
80
However, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the finding of
liability in Harmar because only potential damages to the defend-
ants were proven, not actual.'' Actual economic damage is
required to find liability for using one's dominant market power to
impose restrictions on retailers in the United States. 82 This result
differs from Big Cola in that the CFC did not consider actual, or
even potential damages to Ajemex but reiterated the constitu-
tional right to competition and free access to the market."8 3 The
CFC stated that liability is imposed when there is "detriment to
173. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
174. Id. at 676. Retailers were not prohibited from selling competitors' products like
many retailers in Mexico were required to do by Coca-Cola.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 674-675. The geographic area covered the four neighboring states,
Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, where plaintiffs and defendants
operated concurrently. The bottlers only sold retail to the public in supermarkets,
convenience stores, small grocery stores, and other outlets. These facts are analogous
to Big Cola in which bottlers only sold to retail stores and the geographic area was
confined to the ten metropolitan areas where both companies directly competed with
each other.
178. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, Pigina
131 (Mex.).
179. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 678 (finding treble
damages minus attorney fees).
180. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 340-437. See generally Foreign Exchange Rates,
FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICS (July 1, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
G5/200507011g5.htm.
181. Harmar, 218 S.W.3d at 689-91.
182. Id.
183. Propimex, DE-21-2003 at 343-44.
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the national economy and prejudice to society in general."" With-
out the need to show actual economic damage, it is easier to find
liability for vertical non-price restraints in Mexico than in the
United States. Several specific rulings cited in Big Cola exemplify
this strict approach, which favors antitrust liability and imposes
greater burdens on dominant firms.
For example, an exclusive dealing contract in the United
States may be challenged under either Section One of the Sher-
man Act, Section Three of the Clayton Act, or Section Five of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. s18  The Sherman Act
restricts contracts "in restraint of trade,"186 while the Clayton Act
forbids contracts that "substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce,"'8 7 and the FTC Act
prohibits "unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce."'88 These statutes seek to curtail "[e]xclusive dealing
arrangements [that] foreclose buyers from purchasing goods from
suppliers of their choice and thereby foreclose other suppliers'
access to outlets for their products.""9 Even though competition
may be lessened, some exclusive dealing contracts may have pro-
competitive effects. 90 "In the case of the buyer, they may assure
supply, afford protection against rises in price, enable long-term
planning on the basis of known costs, and obviate the expense and
risk of storage in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a
fluctuating demand. From the seller's point of view, requirements
contracts may make possible the substantial reduction of selling
184. Id. at 344.
185. Arthur I. Cantor, Tying, Exclusive Dealing and Franchising Issues, 1670 PLY/
CORP. 427, 497 (May-June 2008). Much of the analysis in this paragraph and the
following paragraph is based on Mr. Cantor's article.
186. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)).
187. Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914)).
188. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
189. Cantor, supra note 185, at 497.
190. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (finding
that vertical restraints can promote interbrand competition thereby achieving certain
efficiencies in the distribution of its products); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
792 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986) (preventing free-riding and concluding that such a
concern is both legitimate and lawful); Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F.
Supp. 1196, 1219 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (finding that requirement contracts can be
beneficial to newcomers in the market); Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow
Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., No. 88-15043, 1990 WL 12148, at *1, *5 (9th Cir. Feb. 8,
1990) (deciding that exclusive dealing agreements ensure that distributors are wholly
committed to marketing Haagen-Dazs products).
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expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and - of par-
ticular advantage to a newcomer to the field to whom it is impor-
tant to know what capital expenditures are justified - offer the
possibility of a predictable market."9'
For that reason, exclusive dealing contracts "are considered
unreasonable only when the portion of the market foreclosed to
other sellers or buyers is substantial enough to adversely affect
competition."92 To assess whether these contracts have suffi-
ciently foreclosed the market to competitors, there must be a rule
of reason analysis, which examines the violation in relation to the
violator and market.'93 In the United States, the rule of reason
analysis considers: 1.) relevant market definition; 2.) percentage
of market foreclosed;'94 3.) barriers to entry;9 ' 4.) terms of the
agreement;'96 5.) ability to terminate;'97 6.) other distributing
channels; 9 ' 7.) nature of purchaser; 99 8.) nature of product;. ° 9.)
use of exclusive dealing by competitors;20 10.) actual competitive
191. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
192. Cantor, supra note 185, at 498.
193. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
194. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 46 (1998) (finding thirty-eight percent market foreclosure lawful);
see also Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982) (finding twenty-four percent foreclosure
over a long period of time unlawful); Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., No. C-05-
01673 RMW, 2008 WL 4809441, at *1, *20 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (reaffirming Twin
City Sportservice, Inc.); 1 ABA Section on Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law
Developments 222 (Debra J. Pearlstein et al. eds., 5th ed. 2002) ("[J]udicial decisions
have established a virtual safe harbor for market foreclosure of twenty percent or
less.").
195. See Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d. 1138
(D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that high entry barriers create likelihood of
anticompetitive effect).
196. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc., 676 F.2d at 1292 (finding a ten year market
foreclosure unlawful); see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227
(1st Cir. 1983) (finding a two year market foreclosure lawful).
197. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that an agreement terminable in less than one year is presumptively lawful);
see also Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (concluding that incentives in the
agreements made it difficult to switch suppliers).
198. See Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991).
199. See Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (explaining that the purchaser was
an end-user, not a distributor).
200. See Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
101, 122 (1983) ("Exclusive dealing in convenience products [as opposed to shopping
products] that results in foreclosure of retailers is more likely to cause foreclosure of
those retailers' customers.").
201. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding an exclusive dealing agreement lawful where competitors have similar
contracts), affd, 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989).
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impact;20 2 11.) business justifications;23 and 12.) the seller's mar-
204ket power.
The LFCE and its Regulations provide similar criteria for
legal analysis as seen in the Big Cola determination of market
definition, market power, and penalty determination.2 5 Specifi-
cally, exclusive dealing contracts can be found to have pro-compet-
itive effects such as "the significant reduction of administrative
costs" and the "lowering of production or marketing costs derived
from the expansion of an infrastructure," which would negate lia-
bility.20 6 However, the only elements of conviction are that the acts
be carried out within a market in which the actor has substantial
power and does not require market foreclosure as the U.S. does. 07
Because market foreclosure is not a requirement, the only mean-
ingful issues are whether the firm maintains substantial market
202. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir.
1993) ("[TIhe probable effect of the [exclusive] contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account . . . the probable immediate and future
effects ... of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein."
(quoting Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 329)).
203. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984)
(taking business justifications into account).
204. Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that the seller must have market power).
205. See Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCEI [Antitrust Law], as
amended, art. 12, 13, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre de 1992
(Mex.).
206. See Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [RLFCE]
[Federal Regulation of Economic Competition], art. 6, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[DO], 4 de Marzo de 1998 (Mex.) ("Economic agents may accredit before the
Commission whether the gains in efficiency deriving from a relative monopoly
practice have a favorable influence on the process of competition and free
participation in the market, which must be taken into consideration in the evaluation
of the conduct referred to in Article 10 of the Law. Such gains in efficiency are deemed
to include the following, among others: I. [tlhe obtaining of savings in resources which
permit the accused/alleged violator, on a permanent basis, to produce the same
quantity of the good at a lower cost, or a greater quantity at the same cost; II. [tihe
obtaining of lower costs if two or more goods or services are produced jointly than
when separately; III. [t]he significant reduction of administrative costs; IV. [tiransfer
of production technology, or knowledge of the market; and V. [1]owering of production
or marketing costs derived from the expansion of an infrastructure or distribution
network.").
207. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Antitrust Law], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre de 1992 (Mex.). Article 10
defines relative monopolistic practices "subject to verification of articles 11, 12 and 13
of this Law." Id. Even if the CFC took market foreclosure into account, it is doubtful
that liability would have been found in this case. Compare Bell, supra note 33, with
Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 46 (1998) (finding thirty-eight percent market foreclosure lawful), and Pearlstein,
supra note 194 ("[J]udicial decisions have established a virtual safe harbor for market
foreclosure of twenty percent or less.").
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power, has signed an exclusive dealing contract (which virtually
guarantees that liability will be found even though the CFC exam-
ines the violation in relation to the violator and market), and
takes it into consideration."' For this reason, the rule of reason
test in Mexico should be more accurately called per se light.
Mexico's strict approach to antitrust enforcement is also
found in the CFC's imposition of fines. The probability of a fine is
a deterrent when "the fine is an amount that in general is greater
than the gain [from anticompetitive behavior]."29 In Big Cola, the
Commission found the fifteen defendants liable of two separate
offenses: exclusive dealing contracts and refusals to deal.210 The
statute states the fine for such actions is 225,000 times the Mexico
City daily minimum wage "for having engaged in any relative
monopolistic practice."21' Despite two violations of the law, the
CFC only fined each defendant the maximum penalty for one rela-
tive monopolistic practice;" 2 however, a non-immediate threat is
still posed to Coca-Cola in Mexico. "In the event of a repeated
offense, an additional fine may be assessed up to twice the initial
amount."213 According to the LFCE, if Coca-Cola commits either of
these violations again, it could be fined an amount double that
which it was fined for the Big Cola violation.214
Though recidivism was not a factor in this case, the Commis-
sion analyzed the exact same history for each defendant, including
Coca-Cola's proposed merger with Cadbury Schweppes.215 The bot-
tlers and their subsidiaries were not involved in that proposition,
as it was done on a corporate level. Nonetheless, the CFC consid-
ered the corporate act in its analysis of each of their penalties. If
the previous act had been an exclusive dealing contract or refusal
to deal agreement, then those acts would have been considered
just as the Cadbury Schweppes ruling. All parties involved the
208. FERNANDO SANCHEZ UGARTE ET AL., COMPETENCIA ECON6MICA EN Mpxico 20
(Editorial Porrua) (2004) ("Rule of Reason will have greater possibilities to be efficient
by requiring a showing that the investigated company possess substantial power in
the relevant market and that there don't exist efficiencies in the executed conduct.").
209. Id.
210. Pleno de la Comisi6n Federal de Competencia [CFC] [Federal Competition
Commission], Propimex, S.A. de C.V. y Otros, Junio de 2005, DE-021-2003, Pdgina
104 (Mex.).
211. LFCE, art. 35 (Mex.).
212. See Propimex, DE-021-2003 at 437.
213. Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [RLFCE] [Federal
Regulation of Economic Competition], art. 35, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n[DO], 4
de Marzo de 1998 (Mex.).
214. Id.
215. See Propimex, DE-021-2003 at 436.
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second time would have been fined doubled, regardless of their
involvement in the first violation. One can therefore assume that
if any recidivist act had been committed by TCCEC, all others
involved in this second act would be fined double because of the
previous actions of one co-defendant within the Coca-Cola system;
once a portion of the entity has been found guilty of a particular
violation, the entire system is considered tainted. Just as TCCEC
was responsible here for the actions of the bottlers, the bottlers
would be responsible for the actions of TCCEC.216 This follows the
CFC's stated position that a franchise system is one single entity
instead of several independent actors 217 but expands the rule to
include top down liability: a subsidiary is responsible for the
actions of its parent company. 8 This way the Commission encour-
ages greater compliance with competition laws by holding parent
companies responsible for their subsidiaries and vice-versa.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rigid approach demonstrated by the CFC's analysis of
refusal to deal agreements, exclusive dealing contracts, and impo-
sition of fines in Big Cola is consistent with the overall goal of
Mexico's antitrust law: ensuring "access to quality, cheap con-
sumer goods and . . . market access" to competitors. 29 The CFC's
harsh interpretation of the competition law for antitrust enforce-
ment resulted in one of the largest antitrust fines in Mexico's his-
tory and stopped explicitly anticompetitive acts from continuing
even though they likely would have continued in the U.S.22° Mex-
ico's strict attitude may be related to its economic history of
216. Id. at 181.
217. Id.
218. If a parent company is not significantly involved in the operations of a
subsidiary or if the services of a parent are not part of the relevant product market,
then liability is mitigated if not negated. Id. at 154. However, mass media marketing
constitutes sufficient involvement of a parent. Id. at 179-81.
219. PAScuAL GARciA ALBA IDUIATE ET AL., LA PRIMERA DPCADA DE LA COMISI6N
FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA 136 (La Comisi6n Federal de Competencia de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos 2003) (author's translation).
220. Hider, supra note 19. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218
S.W.3d 671, 689-91 (Tex. 2006) (actual harm required); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1993); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco,
Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 46 (1998) (finding thirty-
eight percent market foreclosure lawful); Pearlstein, supra note 194 ("[J]udicial
decisions have established a virtual safe harbor for market foreclosure of twenty
percent or less.").
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exploitation and monopoly control,2 21 but regardless of the reason,
the greater probability of finding violations and the higher fines
imposed will cause fewer monopolistic acts to occur.
221. Ugarte, supra note 1, at 36.
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